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1.  Introduction
The tradition of Choso˘n Korea intellectual history principally owes its philosophical 
framework to Song Neo-Confucianism, especially Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130–1200).  Since 
the Choso˘n dynasty (1392–1910) adopted Neo-Confucianism as the state doctrine,3)
nearly all scholars in the Choso˘n era treated the main topics of Neo-Confucianism. 
Pae Chong-ho (裴宗鎬) in Han’guk yuhaksa (Confucian History of Korea) asserts that 
Choso˘n Neo-Confucianism developed to scrutinize the ethical problems of human be-
ings.  He said:
Because of the state policy of the Choso˘n dynasty, sungnyu o˘kpul (崇儒抑佛, re-
specting Confucianism and repressing Buddhism), Choso˘n Neo-Confucianism 
was destined to replace Buddhism in terms of scrutinizing the problems of mind 
and nature (心性問題).  Accordingly it dealt with the problems of mind and na-
ture much deeper than Chinese Neo-Confucianism and it resulted in sadan-
ch’ilcho˘ngnon (四端七情論, Four Seven Debate) and insim-tosimso˘l (人心道心說, 
human mind and dao mind).  Since its metaphysical basis is directly connected 
with the problem of i (理) and ki (氣), [Choso˘n Neo-Confucianism] developed 
churi (主理, i principle), chugi (主氣, ki principal), and cho˘lch’ung (折衷, compro-
mise).  It later shifted over to discussion about ‘universal’ and ‘particular’, which 
concluded yuri (唯理, i-only) and yugi (唯氣, ki-only).  Here Korean Neo-Confu-
cianism was settled for the time being.4)
One of the unique characteristics of Choso˘n Neo-Confucianism is the fact that Choso˘n 
Neo-Confucians scrutinized human ethical problems according to Zhu Xi’s li-qi (prin-
ciple-material force) theory (理氣論).5)  For example, based on Zhu Xi’s li-qi binary 
theory, Choso˘n scholars developed Neo-Confucian theory into the famous Four Seven 
Debate (四端七情論, sadan-ch’ilcho˘ngnon).  Finally in Choso˘n i (C. li 理) and ki (C. qi
氣) discourses split into an i-only theory and a ki-only theory.
The Four Seven Debate primarily focused on whether human feelings are good or 
bad according to the i-ki binary theory based on the cardinal premise of Neo-Confu-
cianism, that “so˘ng (nature) is the same as i (principle).”  That is to say, good feelings 
belong to so˘ng and i ; bad feelings belong to ki (material force).  However the transcen-
dental characteristic of i as a moral principle made it difﬁcult to maintain “no dichoto-
my” (不可分開) between i and ki when attempting to explain unpredictable human 
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feelings.  Accordingly Yi Hwang, also known as T’oegye, (李滉 退溪, 1501–70) sepa-
rated i from ki and made it an independent and dynamic entity in order to justify hu-
man potential morality.
T’oegye’s assertion seemed to succeed to protect innate human morality, but it im-
manently included a possibility to dismantle Zhu Xi’s li-qi binary theory itself.  In this 
paper, I will attempt to show that Zhu Xi’s theory already foreshadowed the Four Sev-
en Debate in that it becomes unstable in applying it to human ethical problems.  In 
dong so, ﬁrst, I will discuss Zhu Xi’s li-qi binary theory and attributes of li.  Even 
though Zhu Xi maintained “no dichotomy” between li and qi, but he far more empha-
sized li.  Second, I will discuss the cardinal premise of Neo-Confucianism, that “so˘ng is 
the same as i ” and will show i has dual meanings: “what is so” (所以然) and “what 
should be so” (所當然).  Third, I will discuss Zhu Xi’s theory of the mind (心) in terms 
of an epistemological viewpoint.  Lastly, I will discuss the ambiguity in Zhu Xi’s theo-
ry of mind and how they inﬂuenced the Four Seven Debate based on the preceding 
discussions.
Before continuing the discussions it is essential to account for general ideas of Zhu 
Xi’s theory.  To do this we must ﬁrst turn to the philosophical debates that took place 
in Song China (960–1270) and principally centered on the writings of Zhu Xi.
Zhu Xi6) explained the universe in terms of li and qi.  The relation between li and qi
maintains a tension throughout his li-qi theory.  That is to say, it is the principle of 
things that becomes actualized, and actualization requires both principle as its sub-
stance and material force (氣) as its actuality.  Li is necessary to explain the reality and 
universality of things.  It is incorporeal, single, eternal, unchanging, uniform, constitut-
ing the essence of things, and always good.  It does not contain a dichotomy of good 
and evil nor does it create things.  Qi is necessary to explain physical form, individual-
ity, and transformation of material things.  Qi is physical, multitudinous, transitory, 
changeable, constitutes their physical substance, involves both good and evil (depend-
ing on whether its endowment in things is balanced or partial), and is the agent of cre-
ation.7)  The tension of the relation between li and qi is apparent in the following state-
ment by Zhu Xi:
What are called li and qi are certainly two different entities (決是二物).  But con-
sidered from the standpoint of things, the two entities are merged one with the 
other and cannot be separated with each in a different place (不可分開).8)
Li is an absolute, constant, and incorporeal entity; on the other hand, qi is a change-
able, corporeal and physical entity.  And Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory also requires careful un-
derstanding in terms of its two different viewpoints.  First, from an ontological point of 
view, qi forms things which follow li (each existential pattern).  Without li, qi cannot 
form things.  Without qi, li has no place in which to inhere.  Hence creating no dichot-
omy between li and qi (不可分開).  Second, in terms of conception of primary entities 
of the universe, we cannot but prescribe li and qi as two different entities because they 
respectively have different attributes (決是二物).  These two viewpoints are mixed in 
Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory of basic cosmology, but Choso˘n Neo-Confucianism directly ap-
plied this theory to the problem of human feelings and faced the difﬁculty of maintain-
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ing these two mixed viewpoints.
Even though Zhu Xi himself asserted that li and qi are inseparable, the basic con-
cept of Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory differentiates li from qi.  Joseph Needham in Science and
Civilization in China conﬁrms this fact.  According to Needham, “At bottom, Zhu Xi re-
mained a dualist, in the sense that qi and li were coeval and of equal importance in the 
universe, ‘neither afore nor other’, though the residue of belief in some slight ‘superi-
ority’ on the part of the latter was extremely difﬁcult to discard.”9)  Not only did Zhu 
Xi differentiate li from qi, he took li to occupy a superior status to qi.  According to 
Needham, the reason lies in the social class differentiation, that is, Song Neo-Confu-
cians conceived unconsciously that the world of li (Neo-Confucians) is superior to the 
world of qi (farmers and artisans).10)  However Zhu Xi consciously emphasized the 
world of li when criticizing Buddhism and Daoism.  Zhu Xi states:
The only difference between the Confucians and Buddhists in their discourses on 
nature is that the Buddhists talk about emptiness whereas the Confucians talk 
about concreteness, and whereas the Buddhists talk about ‘not having’ (無), the 
Confucians talk about ‘having’ (有)……  With us Confucians, although the mind 
is vacuous, principle (理) is concrete.  The Buddhists, on the other hand, go 
straightly to their destination of emptiness and void.11)
It is not necessary to examine the doctrines of Buddhism and Taoism deeply to 
understand them.  The mere fact that they discard the Three Bonds (between 
ruler and minister, father and son, and husband and wife) and the Five Constant 
Virtues (righteousness on the part of the father, deep love on the part of the 
mother, friendliness on the part of the elder brother, respect on the part of the 
younger brother, and ﬁlial piety on the part of the son) is already a crime of the 
greatest magnitude.  Nothing more need be said about the rest.12)
According to Zhu Xi, Confucianism is concerned with the world of “having,” whereas 
Buddhism and Daoism are concerned with “not having.”  The world of “having” is 
concrete, which is the world of li.  According to Zhu Xi, socially Confucianism em-
phasizes moral values, whereas Buddhism and Daoism discarded them, which is a 
crime.  The cardinal bonds are a type of li or one particular expression of a single li
and they are not distinct from li.  Here we ﬁnd that Zhu Xi’s li includes morality along 
with an existential pattern13) in his cosmological viewpoint; furthermore, he makes no 
distinction between the two characteristics of li.  Likewise it can be said that Zhu Xi 
advocated li as the world of concrete morality.
However, even though the property of li in Zhu Xi’s system originally meant an ex-
istential pattern of myriad things, it came to possess a “transcendental” property owing 
to Buddhism and Daoism.14)  This can be explained if we examine the intellectual at-
mosphere in Zhu Xi’s period.  According to Daniel K. Gardner, “Enlightenment was 
an issue of some interest to almost all intellectuals of the Song.  With the popularity of 
the Ch’an school of Buddhism, Buddhist and non-Buddhist thinkers alike had been in-
troduced to the ideal of enlightenment …… for both Chu and the Ch’an Buddhists 
viewed enlightenment as the total understanding of the true nature of the universe.”15)
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Furthermore Zhu Xi himself studied Buddhism.  According to Hoyt Cleveland Till-
man, “Chu Hsi turned toward Buddhism and Taoism after his father’s death …… was 
attracted to these Ch’an teaching of Ta-hui (1089–1163).”16)  Edwin O. Reischauer also 
concludes that Song Neo-Confucian scholars were strongly inﬂuenced by Buddhism 
and Daoism.  Reischauer states in East Asia: Tradition and Transformation:
The Neo-Confucian thinkers were strongly inﬂuenced by some of the Buddhist 
concepts that had been so important in Chinese thinking for the past few centu-
ries.  Many of them had been students of Buddhism or Taoism before they 
turned to Confucianism, and some had even lived in Zen monasteries.  Bud-
dhism had conditioned men to think in metaphysical terms, and one of the things 
that was new about Neo-Confucianism was that it developed a metaphysics for 
Confucianism, freely utilizing Buddhist ideas and Taoist terminology.  Neo-Con-
fucianism thus was drawn from the diverse intellectual currents of the day, just as 
Han Confucianism had been eclectic in its time.  Essentially, however, it was a 
rejection of the Taoist search for immorality and the Buddhist concern with the 
divine and the afterlife.  It returned to the ancient Chinese emphasis on mun-
dane social and political matters, particularly ethics, and it reasserted the old ag-
nostic, nontheistic tendencies of Chinese thoughts.17)
In short, there was “the tendency of the Buddhists to transcendentalize and super-
naturalize the originally naturalistic organicism18) of Han and pre-Han times.  Hence 
the metaphysical undertones which the word li had acquired by the time it was uti-
lized by Song Neo-Confucians and from which Zhu Xi himself was perhaps never 
quite able to liberate it.”19)  In fact, Zhu Xi, through his interpretations20) of the Four 
Books,21) tried to reassert a true Confucianism, stripped of all Buddhist and Daoist 
inﬂuences22) which had been conspicuous in the writings of previous Neo-Confu-
cians.23)  However, Zhu Xi does not seem to have succeeded in purging all the Bud-
dhist undertones from his core concept, li.  Needham concludes:
The work of Zhu Xi, therefore, was to remove li from most of its Buddhist con-
texts, and to restore its ancient naturalist signiﬁcance, immanent rather than tran-
scendent.  The precise degree to which he was able to do this remains a matter 
for minute future research; certainly his critics of later centuries often believed 
that he did not entirely succeed in divesting the concept of its religious-meta-
physical undertones.24)
In the end, Zhu Xi’s li came to possess two properties simultaneously: immanent 
and transcendental.25)  These two properties of li do not seem to cause any problems 
in the cosmogonic arguments.  In applying it to society, li naturally emphasizes the or-
der of society.  But, in applying it to ethical questions, one encounters a problem be-
cause the two properties of li become unstable, a fact which triggered the Four Seven 
Debate in Choso˘n intellectual history.
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2.  Zhu Xi’s Li-qi Binary Theory (理氣論) and His Theory of Mind (心性論)
a.  Zhu Xi’s Li-qi Binary Theory and Attributes of Li
In terms of Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory, we should be aware of a certain tension between li
and qi.  He states,
What are called principle and material force are certainly two different entities. 
But considered from the standpoint of things, the two entities are merged one 
with the other and cannot be separated with each in a different place.  However, 
this does not destroy the fact that the two entities are each an entity in itself. 
When considered from the standpoint of principle, before things existed, their 
principles of being had already existed.  Only their principles existed, however, 
but not yet the things themselves.  Whenever one studies these aspects, one 
should clearly recognize and distinguish them, and consider both principle and 
material force from the beginning to the end, and then one will be free from er-
ror.26)
Basically Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory includes two viewpoints.  First, when a thing comes into 
being, qi as a fundamental material requires an existential pattern27) or mode of being. 
In terms of “being,” li and qi cannot be separated, that is, li is the existential pattern 
whereby qi is manifested as particular beings.  Therefore li and qi cannot exist as inde-
pendent entities.  Hence Zhu Xi claimed, “No dichotomy” exists between li and qi. 
Second, suppose that we can only distinguish particular things by each existential pat-
tern.  In such a case we cannot but presume the existential pattern is a different entity 
from material qi.  That is to say, the existential pattern is different from the fundamen-
tal material.  For this reason Zhu Xi claimed that li and qi are, “Two different entities.” 
Besides, in his cosmogonic view, li already exists before qi is manifested into particular 
things.  This two-fold deﬁnition eventually had a great inﬂuence on the Four Seven 
Debate.
In terms of Zhu Xi’s qi theory, it is hard to say that his qi theory is unique as he is 
merely following traditional, pre-existing qi theories.  The question “what is li ” seems 
to be a short-cut to understand Zhu Xi’s li-qi system, but such a question might lead to 
confusion because it is directly related to the attributes of li, which naturally generate 
many discussions.28)  Although we cannot avoid discussing the attributes of li, perhaps 
it is more helpful to understand his thought if we ask why he needed li in the ﬁrst 
place.  This question can also help explain the unfolding of Neo-Confucianism in 
Choso˘n intellectual history.
The major proposition of Zhu Xi’s li-qi system is that he claims the universe is com-
posed of li and qi.  He states,
In the universe there has never been any material force (氣) without principle 
(理) or principle without material force.29)
Li and qi are not independent entities.  Thus it is a short leap to suppose that li and qi
have the same value in Zhu Xi’s system.  However, Zhu Xi did not stop at this point 
because his intention was not to emphasize the equality of li and qi :30)
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Question: Which exists ﬁrst, principle (理) or material force (氣)?
Answer: Principle has never been separated from material force.  However, prin-
ciple is what is above physical form (理形而上者)31) whereas material force is 
what is within physical form (氣形而下者).  Hence when spoken of as being 
above or within physical form, is there not the difference of priority and posteri-
ty?  Principle has no physical form, but material force is coarse and contains im-
purities.32)
Zhu Xi’s answer reveals one of the most important attributes of li as transcendental or 
a priori 33) in the metaphysical viewpoint.  Li is the entity above physical form and, at 
the same time, li is also a very pure and ﬁne entity.  Furthermore, li is prior to qi in the 
cosmogonic viewpoint.34)  He also states:
Fundamentally principle and material force cannot be spoken of as prior or pos-
terior.  But if we must trace their origin, we are obliged to say that principle is 
prior.  However, principle is not a separated entity.  It exists right in material 
force.  Without material force, principle would have nothing to adhere to.35)
Zhu Xi appears to accept li ’s priority to qi but at the same time he asserts that li and qi
are not separable.  The latter part of the above passage provides another important 
clue to understand the attribute of li.  Even though li exists in qi, li itself does not have 
any active capacity.  Without qi, li cannot do anything.  Therefore Zhu Xi concludes:
Li has no feeling and intention, no plan and calculation and does not create any-
thing (理却無情意無計度無造作), while qi can integrate and create things (氣即
能凝結造作).36)
According to Zhu Xi, li is the transcendental or a priori being before form, while qi, 
which is the entity after form, is the basic element which composes the physical world. 
Furthermore li cannot be manifested by itself.  That is to say, li does not have any ac-
tive component.  These two attributes of li must be the bottom line in discussing Zhu 
Xi’s li theory.  If we consider li according to these attributes, we could ask the question 
why Zhu Xi needed li.  Here we can suggest another way to approach Zhu Xi’s li-qi
system and its subsequent unfolding in the context of Choso˘n intellectual history.  Ex-
amining the necessity of li in Zhu Xi’s system and the intellectual debates of Choso˘n 
Neo-Confucianism provides an easier point of departure for understanding the philo-
sophical system of the time.
Zhu Xi intended to transplant a metaphysical component into Confucianism.  We 
can ﬁnd this in Zhu Xi’s comments on “An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great 
Ultimate” (太極圖說) written by Zhou Dunyi (周敦頤, 1017–72).  Zhou wrote:
The Ultimate of Non-being (無極) and also the Great Ultimate (而太極)!  The 
Great Ultimate through movement generates Yang (陽).  When its activity (動) 
reaches its limit, it becomes tranquil (靜).  Through tranquility the Great Ultimate 
generates Yin (陰).  When tranquility reaches its limit, activity begins again.  So 
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activity and tranquility alternate and become the root of each other, giving rise to 
the distinction of Yin and Yang, and the two modes (兩儀) are thus established.
By the transformation of yang and its union with yin, the Five Agents (五行) of 
Water, Fire, Wood, Metal, and Earth arise.  When these ﬁve material forces (氣) 
are distributed in harmonious order, the four seasons run their course.
The Five Agents constitute one system of Yin and Yang, and Yin and Yang 
constitute one Great Ultimate.  The Great Ultimate is fundamentally the Non-ul-
timate.  The Five Agents arise, each with its speciﬁc nature (性).
When the reality of the Ultimate of Non-being and the essence of Yin, Yang, 
and the Five Agents come into mysterious union, integration ensues.  Ch’ien (乾, 
Heaven) constitutes the male element, and k’un (坤, Earth) constitutes the female 
element.  The interaction of these two material forces engenders and transforms 
the myriad things.  The myriad things produce and reproduce, resulting in an 
unending transformation.37)
“An Explanation of the Diagram” has been regarded as the essence of Neo-Confucian 
cosmogony.  Its structure proceeds from the Great Ultimate38) to the myriad of things. 
That is to say, the Great Ultimate generates Yin and Yang ; the Yin and Yang generate 
the Five Agents; then, the myriad of things come into being.  Here we can ask, what is 
the property of the Great Ultimate as an origin of the myriad of things?  Zhu Xi inter-
preted it as follows:
The Great Ultimate (太極) is nothing other than principle.39)
In this case, the structure of “An Explanation of the Diagram” abruptly changes.  The 
Great Ultimate is replaced by li ; then, li comes to produce the myriad of things.  This 
is one of the most difﬁcult parts in understanding Zhu Xi’s philosophy.40)  When Wing-
tsit Chan translates Zhu Xi’s explanation about “An Explanation of the Diagram,”41)
he comments, “The difference between Zhou Dunyi and Zhu Xi is that for Zhou the 
Great Ultimate involves activity and tranquility, whereas for Zhu, it has only the prin-
ciple (理) of activity and tranquility, for the Great Ultimate is absolute and is therefore 
above phenomenal manifestations.  Actually, Zhou’s Great Ultimate is identical with 
material force (氣), whereas Zhu’s Great Ultimate is identical with principle (理).  As 
to how the Great ultimate can produce the two material forces (Yin and Yang), Zhu’s 
answer is vague.”42)  More speciﬁcally, the question of “how li produces Yin and 
Yang” remains problematic.  It has a potential problem which might be developed 
into “li issues (理發),” whereupon li becomes an independent substance different from 
qi.  As a result, Zhu Xi asserts that the Great Ultimate is li.  Thus li has a strong ten-
dency towards becoming ‘substance’ from which the myriad of things come into be-
ing.  Hughes also concluded that Zhu Xi cleared the way for an emphasis on sub-
stance in China.43)
Zhu Xi’s philosophical system is based on the traditional qi theory.  And he tried to 
transplant the concept of ‘substance’, namely, the transcendental property of li, into 
the world of qi.  Thus Confucianism abruptly extended its capacity from primarily 
dealing with the socio-political sphere to encompassing complex metaphysical argu-
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ments.  Hence the emergence of the Neo-Confucian li-qi binary theory.44)  Further-
more Zhu Xi strongly emphasizes the role of li in his li-qi system.  He claims:
Before Heaven and Earth existed, there was after all only principle.  As there is 
this principle, therefore there are Heaven and Earth.  If there were no principle, 
there would also be no Heaven and Earth, no man, no things, and in fact, no 
containing or sustaining (of things by Heaven and Earth) to speak of.  As there is 
principle, there is therefore material force to operate everywhere and nourish 
and develop all things.45)
In sum, Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory maintains two different positions at the same time: 
“No dichotomy” and “Two different entities.”  These two characteristics later provided 
a theoretical basis for the Choso˘n Four Seven Debate.  Zhu Xi’s understanding of li re-
veals it as having two fundamental properties.  Li is transcendental and also non-dy-
namic.  The former property was inﬂuenced by Buddhism and Daoism,46) and the lat-
ter was developed from the traditional meaning of li as an existential pattern.  Zhu Xi 
replaced the Great Ultimate with li in the Diagram of the Great Ultimate (太極圖) and 
consequently forced li to play a pivotal role as the ‘substance’ producing the myriad of 
things.47)  In doing so Zhu Xi further emphasized the role of li.
b.  Xing (性, Human Nature) is the Same as Li (理, Principle): Dual Meanings of Li
Now we need to look into the relationship between li (理, principle; K. i ) and xing
(性, human nature; K. so˘ng ) because it is the key to understanding the unfolding of 
Choso˘n Neo-Confucianism in the later era.48)  More speciﬁcally, the Four Seven De-
bate concerns how to solve the moral problem of human feelings (or mind) according 
to i (理, principle; C. li ) and ki (氣, material force; C. qi ).  It is thus necessary to scruti-
nize the relationship between li, or existential pattern, and xing.
Zhu Xi said, “Xing (性)49) consists of concrete li, complete with humanity, righteous-
ness, propriety, and wisdom.”50)  And he then declares the famous proposition as fol-
lows:
Xing (性) is the same as li (理).  It is li of dangran (當然之理); it thus includes no 
evil.51)
This is one of the major premises of Neo-Confucianism, but the proposition, “xing is 
the same as li,”52) needs further analysis because it contains dual linguistic meaning. 
The key to understanding the problem lies in the following proposition, “it is li of 
dangran.”  The problem is caused by the use of the word “dangran” (K. ta· ng’yo˘n).  Even 
though it can be literally translated as “natural,” it includes two meanings.  First, it 
means, “self-evident” or “apparent,” and it also means that a certain proposition is 
true.  For example, in the case of the proposition, “water is composed of oxygen and 
hydrogen,” we can prove it to be true or false.  Through an experiment we can de-
compose water into oxygen and hydrogen, and we can prove the proposition to be 
true.  In this case, we can say, “It is self-evident (當然) that water is composed of oxy-
gen and hydrogen.”  Second, it means, “ought to” or “should,” and it describes a cer-
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tain value system.  For example, we can have a proposition such as “human beings 
should (當然) practice the Five Virtues.”  This is a proposition about a value judgment. 
So the double meanings of dangran generate two propositions as follows:
a)  Li  is dangran.
b)  Xing  is dangran.
As we discussed before, the propositions a and b have different values.  Proposition a
concerns li, namely, an existential pattern, whereas proposition b concerns xing, name-
ly, human nature.  Li is dangran because it is true that things possess their own existen-
tial pattern.  Xing is dangran because human beings should follow the Four Virtues. 
The former indicates a description of things, while the latter indicates the moral atti-
tude of human beings.  Thanks to the word “dangran,” the two different propositions 
come to be connected.  On the other hand, it can be said that li can justify the truth 
value of xing.  That is to say, human beings should follow the Four Virtues as the myri-
ad of things possess their own existential pattern.
Thanks to the proposition, “xing is the same as li,” as we can recognize the universe 
with li, so do we recognize human beings with the same li.  Li then makes the human 
realm united with the cosmic realm.  On the other hand, the universe, or Heaven, is 
maintained by li, while human society should also be maintained by the same li.  In 
arriving at this point the proposition ﬁnally achieves the Confucian goal of a unity be-
tween Heaven and human beings.
However, the argument in the proposition can also proceed in the opposite direc-
tion.  Since li is equivalent to xing, li comes to possess the properties of xing.  Li, as an 
existential pattern, acquires the value which is the property of xing.  That is to say, li is 
transformed from a value free abstraction into a certain value system which prescribes 
and governs the world.  In other words, li is not only an existential pattern of a thing 
or physical law, but becomes an existential pattern of the society, or a moral law, 
which, according to Benjamin I. Schwartz, is one of the characteristics of Chinese 
thought.53)
In sum, for Zhu Xi the cosmos itself is moral.  We can assure this fact in the propo-
sition, “Xing is the same as li ” Li is originally an existential pattern which causes a 
thing to be and xing, as human morality, prescribes human behaviors.  However, in 
the Neo-Confucian cosmology li possesses two properties of both “what is so” and 
“what should be so.”
c.  Zhu Xi’s Theory of the Mind: Epistemological Viewpoint
Since Choso˘n Neo-Confucian scholars tried to explain human feelings in terms of i
and ki it is necessary to examine how Zhu Xi dealt with the mind.  In this section, I 
will discuss the mind from an epistemological viewpoint.54)
Zhu Xi states that, “Xin (心, mind) is the pure part of qi ”55) and “there exists a spiri-
tual (靈) thing in qi.”56)  Choso˘n Neo-Confucians largely followed this deﬁnition in 
which the mind is ki and its function is beyond our understanding.
In the case of Zhu Xi though, the concept of li involves the mind, even though he 
admitted the mind is qi.  He said,
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[In terms of understanding,] there already exists li of understanding (知覺).  But 
li does not yield understanding yet.  Qi is integrated and formed, and li becomes 
united with qi; then, understanding comes to exist.57)
In short, li is united with qi in the mind.  Then understanding (知覺) occurs.  The 
agent of our understanding is our mind and our understanding comes to exist from the 
unity of li and qi.
Furthermore Zhu Xi’s theory of the mind includes a particular epistemological ele-
ment.  To better understand his argument we can interpret his mind theory to consist 
of three steps.  First, Zhu Xi divides the mind by means of li-qi theory into daoxin (道
心, Dao mind; K. tosim) and renxin (人心, human mind; K. insim).58)  Second, he asserts 
the superiority of daoxin, which results in li being innate.  Then, he presents the innate 
li as the means by which humans recognize external phenomena.  Third, he shows a 
tendency to reject the function of renxin.
Examining these three steps in more detail, Zhu Xi’s ﬁrst step entails dividing the 
mind into renxin and daoxin by means of his li-qi theory.  According to Zhu Xi, the 
mind is empty.  When we hear or see something, it is the mind that can see or hear 
the phenomena.59)  The mind is the basis whereby we can see or know a thing.
In elucidating the major Neo-Confucian premise that “xing is the same as li,” Zhu 
Xi asserts that, with reference to the mind, we call li xing.60)  Finally he claims that li
adheres to qi in the mind.61)  These propositions entail two sub-concepts: renxin and 
daoxin, that is, a human being possesses both renxin and daoxin.  Renxin originates from 
qi and it is psychophysical conditions, such as desires to see and hear, that make renxin
perceive external phenomena.  However, the case of daoxin is different.  Daoxin comes 
from li and since li is the ontological basis for this mind, it accordingly affects its un-
derstanding of phenomena.  Further difference between these two minds is that each 
one perceives (知覺) and understands (知)62) things differently.  According to Zhu Xi, 
by means of daoxin, we can understand moral principles; by means of renxin, we can 
perceive sounds, colors, smells, and tastes.63)  Even though the mind is single, the ob-
jects we can know are different.  Zhu Xi accepts that that which knows or perceives is 
the psychophysical mind, which originates from qi.  He divides it, though, into two dif-
ferent aspects by the realms to which each mind belongs.  Renxin belongs to qi; daoxin
belongs to li.
In the second step of his theory of the mind, Zhu Xi emphasizes the aspect of daoxin
in the process of recognizing a phenomenon.  Zhu Xi’s explanation of renxin is com-
paratively easy to understand because it describes perceptions in general.  However, 
daoxin is slightly more complicated and requires further elucidation.  That is to say, 
what daoxin understands is li, while at the same time it is li, the basis of daoxin, which 
enables it to understand li.  Since daoxin already entails li, there is no difference be-
tween the li in daoxin and the li that daoxin understands.64)  With this argument, Zhu 
Xi efﬁciently rearranged the cognitive process centering on daoxin; that is, he tried to 
impose order (li, daoxin) over chaotic feelings (qi, renxin).
According to Zhu Xi, “The Great Ultimate is merely the principle of Heaven and 
Earth and the myriads of things …… with respect to the myriad of things, there is the 
Great Ultimate in each and every one of them.”65)  Zhu Xi claims that all things pos-
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sess their own li.  Zhu Xi continues, “Although the mind is a distinct entity, it is empty, 
and therefore embraces all principles.”66)  “Nature is principle.  The mind is its reser-
voir and issues it forth into operation.”67)  Second he is asserting that the mind is the 
reservoir of li.  In this case, ‘the mind’ indicates the aspect of daoxin, that is, the li com-
ponent of the mind of human beings.  Then, the fact that we understand the li of the 
myriads of things means that we can understand the li of them within our mind, par-
ticularly daoxin.  As a result, Zhu Xi said, “The mind and li are one.  Li is not like a 
thing in front of us, but li exists within the mind.”68)  Therefore, for Zhu Xi, the pro-
cess of knowing the myriad of things principally leads to knowing the li of the myriad 
of things within our daoxin.
Generally when we say that we know a thing, according to Zhu Xi, it means that we 
know the li of the thing.  Because li and the mind are one, we come to know the li
within the mind, which means in knowing the li we also know external things since 
the same li extends throughout all phenomena.  Zhu Xi states that, “What is known is 
the li of the mind; what is able to know is the spirit of ki.”69)
Yamada Keiji (山田慶児) clearly explained these relationships of what makes us 
know, what we can know, and what is known in Zhu Xi’s system.  According to Yamada,70)
the mind already entails multifarious li or cognitive patterns.  When we try to under-
stand or perceive objects, the objects become understood or perceived by cognitive 
patterns within our mind.  Accordingly, it is those patterns within our mind that we 
recognize.  In other words, we already possess the cognitive patterns within our mind. 
When we recognize an object, we try to ﬁnd a well-ﬁtting pattern for the object from 
our collection of cognitive patterns.  For this reason Zhu Xi can claim that the mind 
possesses multifarious li.  The fact that we recognize the object means that we recog-
nize the li of the object.  The fact that we recognize the li of the object means that we 
recognize the li within us, that is, within the mind.  According to Zhu Xi, human be-
ings are born with those li or cognitive patterns.  As a result, li plays a pivotal role in 
human cognitive process.
In the third step of his theory of the mind, Zhu Xi tends to dismiss renxin.  The rela-
tion between renxin and daoxin can be explained in the same way as that of li-qi.  Zhu 
Xi compared it to the relation of a boat (renxin) and its helm (daoxin).71)  If we leave the 
boat as it were, we cannot know where it would proceed.  On the other hand, if we 
are at the helm, we could control the boat with our own will.  In other word, we can-
not rely on recognition of the world derived from renxin.  For this reason, we need 
daoxin to provide order to renxin.
Here we encounter a problem in Zhu Xi’s theory of the mind.  There is not much 
emphasis placed on the cognitive theory for renxin in Zhu Xi’s system.  Likewise it is 
not easy to deal with crude sense data, desires or other things which renxin recognizes. 
As a result, Zhu Xi’s theory shows a tendency to dismiss the world of renxin because it 
exists outside of the ordered cognitive framework.  His theory therefore leads to the 
conclusion that renxin is not the object of knowledge; it must be controlled by daoxin. 
Zhu Xi states:
The mind is not like a side door which can be enlarged by force.  We must elimi-
nate the obstructions of selﬁsh desires, and then it will be pure and clear and able 
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to know all.  When the principles of things and events are investigated to the ut-
most, penetration will come as a sudden release.  Heng-ch’ü (Chang Tsai) said, 
‘Do not allow what is seen or heard to fetter the mind.’  ‘By enlarging one’s mind 
one can enter into all things in the world.’  This means that if penetration is 
achieved through moral principles, there will be penetration like a sudden re-
lease.  If we conﬁne (the mind) to what is heard and what is seen, naturally our 
understanding will be narrow.72)
As a result, the tendency to reject the world of renxin by Zhu Xi’s theory led Choso˘n 
Neo-Confucianism to emphasize human morality much stronger than their Song coun-
terparts and also led to the Four Seven Debate.  However, despite the historical devel-
opments that would unfold in Choso˘n Korea, Zhu Xi’s main intention was to build a 
new cognitive paradigm whereby human beings could understand the external world, 
that is, understand the external world as the world of li.  Nevertheless Zhu Xi’s li-qi
theory always maintains a degree of tension between li and qi.
3.  Ambiguity in Zhu Xi’s Theory of Mind
The goal of this paper is to examine the philosophical background of the Four Sev-
en Debate in Choso˘n.  For this reason, we discussed Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory in the previ-
ous sections as they provided the intellectual basis for the Four Seven Debate.  In this 
section, we will discuss brieﬂy what elements of Zhu Xi’s theory inﬂuenced the Four 
Seven Debate.
Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory maintains two different characteristics at the same time: “No 
dichotomy” between li and qi, yet they are also “Two different entities.”  From an on-
tological point of view, qi forms things in accordance with li (existential pattern). 
Without li, qi cannot form things.  Hence it can be said that there is no dichotomy be-
tween li and qi.  In terms of conceptions about primary entities of the universe, we 
cannot but prescribe li and qi to be two different entities because they each have dif-
ferent attributes.  Zhu Xi’s li is transcendental and non-dynamic.  The former is an 
inﬂuence from Buddhism and Daoism, and the latter developed from the traditional 
meaning of li as an existential pattern.73)  Zhu Xi replaced the Great Ultimate with li
in the Diagram of the Great Ultimate (太極圖).  Consequently li came to play a pivotal 
role as “substance” in producing the myriad of things.  Generally Zhu Xi emphasized 
the role of li.
However, Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory is not so easy to apply to the mind of human beings. 
According to Zhu Xi, daoxin should control renxin.74)  Daoxin comes from xing, while 
renxin comes from qing (情).  In this case xing is the same as li.  As a result, we arrive at 
the proposition, “li controls or should control feelings.”75)
Generally speaking, the mind creates feelings, but the feelings created by the mind 
are not always constant.  In this case it then becomes hard to describe li as controlling 
feelings within li-qi theory.  Upon reﬂecting on one’s feelings it is presumable that li
does not always control feelings.  Accounting for this discrepancy is one of the most 
difﬁcult points of li-qi theory.76)  The mind of human beings does not always maintain 
order and control over its feelings.  Therefore the proposition cannot help but become 
changed to a value-proposition, “therefore li should control the feelings,” or: therefore 
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a human being should follow nature.”  This ﬁnal proposition requires our value judg-
ment.
The difﬁculty lies in the Choso˘n Neo-Confucians’ interpretation of li.  Zhu Xi insist-
ed that the crucial thing was to have the mind act in accord with principle to regulate 
and control the feelings.77)  However it is not easy if we try to justify the origin of the 
good feelings within li-qi theory because the problem concerns the whole system of li-
qi theory.78)  The Choso˘n Neo-Confucians’ understanding was basically that bad feel-
ings belong to ki ; good feelings belong to i.  The good feelings are connected to hu-
man morality.  To protect human morality, Choso˘n Neo-Confucians could not help 
but divide i from ki ; furthermore, they granted dynamism to i in order to justify the 
origin of the good feelings.  T’oegye asserts i ’s issuance.  In this case i becomes dy-
namic.  This viewpoint emphasizes the “two different entities” of Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory, 
and li is also emphasized as “substance.”  Consequently li becomes an independent 
entity and dynamic.  The implication of this view is contradictory to another part of 
Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory.  That is to say, that li is non-dynamic and that there is “no di-
chotomy” between li and qi.  The disparity between these two viewpoints of Zhu Xi’s 
li-qi theory is one of the deﬁning characteristics of Choso˘n Neo-Confucianism.
However, Zhu Xi’s writings fail to clarify whether li or xing is dynamic.  When Zhu 
Xi was asked whether xing is active, he answered, “The place that moves is the mind; 
what moves is nature.”79)  This answer is inconsistent in Zhu Xi’s philosophical system. 
Xing is the same as li; thus xing should not possess any dynamism, since li does not 
possess it.  Zhu Xi also states:
Qi has both the states of activity and tranquility (動靜).  Since li is loaded on qi, 
how could we say that there are no states of activity and tranquility?80)
Zhu Xi seems to concede that li possesses dynamism.  If qi is active, li also is active 
because li and qi are inseparable.  More importantly, in Classiﬁed Conversations of Chu 
Tzu (朱子語類), the churinonja (主理論者, scholars of li principal theory) of Choso˘n 
found a pivotal passage to support li dynamism as follows:
The Four Beginnings are the issuance of principle; the Seven Feelings are the is-
suance of material force.  (四端理之發; 七情氣之發)81)
This passage is highly controversial because li and qi are separate and possess dyna-
mism, which is contradictory to the original “no dichotomy” and “li ’s non-dynamism” 
of Zhu Xi’s original theory.  Tu Wei-ming concludes, “It is well known that the prob-
lem of whether or not principle ‘moves’ (動, in Chinese, tung ) is highly controversial 
in Zhu Xi’s philosophy of mind.”82)
4.  Conclusion
The li-qi theory of Song China has three theoretical ambiguities for triggering the 
Choso˘n Four Seven Debate.  First, Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory maintains two different posi-
tions at the same time: “No dichotomy” and “Two different entities,” which are the 
two wings of his theory.  However the theory itself is highly unstable and Zhu Xi fur-
174
ther emphasized the role of li more than that of qi.  These two facts provided the 
Choso˘n Neo-Confucian scholars with the basis to easily grant dynamism to i.  Second, 
the logical ambiguity of the proposition, “Xing is the same as li,” enabled li to possess 
two properties of both “what is so” and “what should be so,” namely an existential 
pattern and morality.  Therefore li itself became to possess the morality.  Third, Zhu 
Xi divided the mind by means of li-qi theory into daoxin and renxin, and he asserted 
the superiority of daoxin to renxin.  He also asserted that renxin should be controlled by 
daoxin, which is highly problematic in terms of whether it is always possible.
To protect human morality, the Choso˘n Neo-Confucians such as T’oegye divided i, 
tosim, and good feelings from ki, insim, and bad feelings, and they granted dynamism 
and morality to the ﬁrst part.  That is to say, they succeeded in providing li with an 
autonomous movement towards moral behaviors.  So human beings can do moral be-
haviors by means of the autonomous movement of li in them.  However the theory of 
the Choso˘n Neo-Confucians included a critical weak point in that they had to discard 
one of the two wings of Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory: no dichotomy.  And it contains a possi-
bility to dismantle Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory itself, which is one of the reasons that the de-
bate never ended.
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